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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the market reaction to the existence of traders
aﬀected by biased conﬁdence, whose conﬁdence is in turn dependent on particular traits of
the information they observe, namely its strength (salience), and weight (statistical
signiﬁcance). Conﬁdence function is introduced as a way of formalizing the relationship
between diﬀerent attributes of information and conﬁdence. We show in a simple setting
that if investorsʼ conﬁdence is aﬀected by information strength and information weight,
then prices exhibit delayed overreaction to information events ; this overreaction may
continue for a prolonged period of time. Furthermore, as more and more information is
introduced, uncertainty might increase among irrational investors and prices tend to
underreact to ambiguous news. We also examine the resulting implications for market
liquidity and price eﬃciency. In another case based on a generalized setting, we learn that
depending on the intensity of irrational trading, prices exhibit positive serial correlation
when there are few miscalibrated traders in the economy or their bias is moderate ; prices
overreact to news if the opposite conditions are met.
 Introduction
Substantial body of evidence from experiments suggests that people are “miscalibrated”
when making decisions in uncertain environments. Miscalibration is a term used to
describe errors in conﬁdence. We are miscalibrated if our beliefs regarding the correctness
of our estimate of an unknown variable depart from rational, given the available informa-
tion. This article argues that if we take into account the relationship of biases in
conﬁdence with the information structure of the economy, we not only end up with fuller
understanding of the role of bounded rationality and information in ﬁnancial markets, but
also with some conclusions that extend the results of previous research. In addition to that,
given the emphasis on information, we are able to generate some interesting empirical
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implications regarding dynamical patterns in asset prices.
Two factors will play main roles in our analysis : investor conﬁdence and information, in
particular the strength and weight of information. Our approach is motivated by experi-
mental evidence documented in Peterson and Pitz (1988) [18] as well as Griﬃn and
Tversky (1992) [12]. They ﬁnd that when evaluating the impact of new information,
“people are overconﬁdent when (itʼs) strength is high and weight is low, and under-
conﬁdent when (itʼs) strength is low and weight is high
1)
”.
Interpreting these results with a ﬁnancial market framework in mind leads us naturally
to question the relevance of relationship between information and conﬁdence for the
behavior of asset prices. According to the above ﬁndings, individuals with strong signals
about the underlying value of the asset should be overconﬁdent in the quality of their
signals. On the other hand, those with low-strength, high-weight signals should exhibit
underconﬁdence with respect the quality of their signals.
If we want to formalize the relationship between conﬁdence and diﬀerent information
characteristics, the ﬁrst step is to actually deﬁne what constitutes strength and weight of
information. Our setup should be consistent with the results of experiments performed by
Griﬃn and Tversky (1992) [12] and also those by Nelson et.al. (2001) [16]. The latter
article presents an experimental study of the eﬀects of information strength and weight
designed speciﬁcally with ﬁnancial markets in mind. Brieﬂy summarizing their technique,
high-strength, low-weight information is represented by a small number of fair coin ﬂips
with the same results (e.g. 3 coin tosses with 3 heads), while low-strength, high-weight
information typically consists of a large number of coin tosses with a small diﬀerential
between the number of heads and tails (e.g. 17 coin tosses with 10 heads
2)
).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce some
evidence from the cognitive psychology literature that motivates our analysis of the
interrelation between conﬁdence and information. Section 3 reviews extant related litera-
ture that applies biased conﬁdence in ﬁnancial settings. We present the main ideas and
results of this paper in Section 4, where we also motivate our setup with intuitive
examples. We discuss robustness issues and some extensions in Section 5 and ﬁnish with a
conclusion and suggestions for further research.
 Evidence on Information and Conﬁdence
Experiments in cognitive psychology and economics aimed upon identifying systematic
biases in individual decision making under uncertainty abound in examples of over- and
underconﬁdence, often with respect to various types of information. Apparently, we
humans are not neutral, rational information processors but tend to overestimate the
weight of given evidence in some contexts while underestimate the signiﬁcance of the data
at hand in other contexts. In this section we introduce some important experimental work
on biases in conﬁdence and discuss their implications and validity when evaluated in
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relation to information within an economy. We focus on articles that allow for qualitative
considerations of information, conﬁdence, uncertainty, and the relationships between the
three phenomena.
Overconﬁdence and excessive certainty are two terms often treated as equivalent, particu-
larly in applications to ﬁnancial economics : an agentʼs ability to predict the accuracy of his
judgment (conﬁdence) is dealt with similarly or in exactly the same manner as an agentʼs
beliefs regarding possible values of an unknown variable (uncertainty). Peterson and Pitz
(1988) [18] provide evidence that conﬁdence and uncertainty are in fact two distinct
cognitive phenomena and are aﬀected in diﬀerent ways by the available information. The
diﬀerence between conﬁdence and uncertainty can be thought of as a counterpart to the
diﬀerence between hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing. To put it another way,
when we are to predict an event, our uncertainty can be assessed based on generation of
possible outcomes, whilst our conﬁdence is assessed whenever we evaluate a hypothesis
that has already been put forward.
A particularly striking result from Petersonʼs and Pitzʼs (1988) [18] study is that
uncertainty increased with increased amount of information, which is contrary to the
predictions of statistical theory. This increase in uncertainty is shown to be caused by
inconsistent information, such that may suggest conﬂicting outcomes. Conﬁdence, on the
other hand, increased with more information in the experiments administered by the
authors. However, conﬁdence decreased signiﬁcantly on the individual level in response to
more diﬃcult tasks. Another noteworthy result showed that conﬁdence was found to be
aﬀected by salient but irrelevant information and not aﬀected by nonsalient yet relevant
information. The two phenomena are not totally distinct― they are shown to be correlated
with each other and the level of correlation to be a function of the way information was
provided ; it is crucial whether information is used to generate hypotheses or to evaluate
previously stated hypotheses.
In a related study, Griﬃn and Tversky (1992) [12] focus explicitly on how diﬀerent
attributes of information aﬀect judgments of conﬁdence. They ﬁnd that the main determi-
nant of conﬁdence is the relation between the strength and the weight of available
evidence. Strength is understood to stand for extremeness or salience of information, while
weight represents its statistical signiﬁcance or credence. The main conclusion is that
people are overconﬁdent when strength is high and weight is low, and underconﬁdent
when strength is low and weight is high. The experiments suggest that conﬁdence is
determined by the balance of arguments for and against conﬂicting propositions, with
insuﬃcient regard for the weight of the evidence. Even though Griﬃn and Tversky (1992)
[12] do not attempt an analysis of the distinctions and possible relationship between
conﬁdence and uncertainty, their decisive results provide much insight into the way
peopleʼs conﬁdence evolves in response to diﬀerent information. In particular, they show it
is not only overconﬁdence that is prevalent ; underconﬁdence is also a common occurrence
in uncertain environments, mainly ones characterized by complicated information struc-
tures.
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It is noteworthy that the notions of the strength and weight of information discussed by
Griﬃn and Tversky (1992) [12], and, in general, the concept of evidence weight, have its
origins in the work of Keynes (1921) [15], who distinguished between probability, which
represents the balance of evidence in favor of a particular proposition and weight of
evidence, representing the quantity of evidence that supports that balance. In this paper
we follow the extant behavioral ﬁnance literature that uses over- and underconﬁdence to
mean both erroneous conﬁdence and excessive certainty/uncertainty.
 Related Literature
Perhaps two papers closest in focus to the present one are Bloomﬁeld et.al.(2000) [5]
and Bernardo and Welch (2001) [3]. Reliability of information is the focus of a study by
Bloomﬁeld et.al.(2000) [5]. They motivate their experimental setup with a straightforward
representative investor model of Bayesian learning. The investor has access only to a noisy
signal about the accuracy of his information, which leads her to overestimate the reliability
of highly unreliable information and underestimate the reliability of highly reliable informa-
tion. The authors refer to this phenomenon as moderated conﬁdence― conﬁdence moves
toward an average, yet insuﬃcient level. In two experiments designed to test the model,
Bloomﬁeld et. al. (2000) [5] provide investors with perfect information regarding the
reliability of their signals. Nevertheless, the resulting asset prices are found to exhibit
persistent deviations from fundamental values : the markets underreact more to information
of high reliability than to information of low reliability. Another ﬁnding is that extreme
prices are observed : high prices are too high, and conversely, low prices are too low. An
interesting insight into the outcomes of the experiments is that investors do not actually
overreact to information ; rather, unreliable information produces moderate overreaction,
but reliable information gives rise to large underreactions. Eﬀectively, it is possible that
prices in a setting with conﬂicting news of diﬀerential reliability move in the wrong
direction altogether.
Informational cascades are the background of a model used to explain the persistence of
overconﬁdent behavior to be found in a paper by Bernardo and Welch (2001) [3]. When
information aggregation within a population is poor, overconﬁdent individuals― entrepre-
neurs― can mitigate the negative eﬀects of herding behavior by conveying valuable
private information. In doing so, they act altruistically : irrational choices adversely aﬀect
their welfare but they help the overall well-being of the group. Conditions are identiﬁed
under which the costs born by entrepreneurs are low while keeping the beneﬁts to the
overall group high. Groups with suﬃcient amount of activity caused by overconﬁdent
entrepreneurs are shown to have an evolutionary advantage over groups without such
individuals so that in equilibrium overconﬁdence survives.
The paper explains the long-run existence of agents who follow their own information.
However, the attributes of this information in no way inﬂuence the agentsʼ choices ; thus
The Ritsumeikan Economic Review (Vol. 61, No. 1)134
134( )
the evidence of Griﬃn and Tversky (1992) [12] is not taken into account in this model―
the overconﬁdent always follow their own information with no regard to its strength
and/or its weight.
 Information and Conﬁdence in Financial Markets
In recent years, a number of ﬁnancial market models with overconﬁdent traders have
been proposed. Typically, overconﬁdence is assumed exogenously in the form of excessive
certainty, i.e. tightness of a distribution function of an unknown variable. This, in eﬀect, is
equivalent to overvaluing the precision of oneʼs information. It is often the case that little
attention is given to possible causes of miscalibration― overconﬁdence is taken as a
primitive fact about the behavior of individuals. It appears that there may be a bias among
economists as to which biases evidenced in the cognitive psychology literature to empha-
size and utilize. Though overconﬁdence is documented to be a pervasive error in decision
making, it often stems from more primitive variables in the economy, notably from the
structure of uncertainty and information. Also, miscalibration does not manifest itself only
as overconﬁdence ; in numerous cases, underconﬁdence has been observed yet its implica-
tions for behavior in ﬁnancial market settings have been largely ignored. In this section,
we develop a simple model where the perceived precision of investor information changes
due to informational eﬀects.
The ﬂow of information aﬀects the way agents in an economy view investment
opportunities. Information may arrive in many diﬀerent ways and can accordingly be
interpreted diﬀerently by heterogeneous individuals. Extreme informational signals are
processed diﬀerently than signals that are closer to their ex ante expected values.
Sequences of signals may provide more information than a single one― good news that
follows bad news might result in an updated belief that may contrast with the belief
resulting from a sequence of bad news following good news. Beliefs themselves may be
updated in various ways depending on the length of time or the number of information
events since ﬁrst signals were received. In general, conﬁdence comes into play when
agents update their beliefs regarding uncertain variables in the economy in response to a
sequence of informational signals.
An appropriate signal structure that would allow for modeling information strength and
information weight should preferably be a multiple-signal environment. A convenient
feature found in a class of models is signals additivity― whenever an outcome of a series
of signals can be summarized by one value, e.g. when a series of two good signals and a
bad one is equivalent to one good signal. Stylized models that exhibit this feature include
Harris and Raviv (1993) [14], who allow their signals to be drawn from a real line, and
Chari and Kehoe (2004) [9], where signals are binary. Yet additivity alone is insuﬃcient
for our purposes― the total number of signals received is also important. Furthermore, we
wish to focus our attention on the interrelation between information structures and
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investor conﬁdence. The modeling choices we make have to be consistent with the
experimental evidence presented above.
Consequently, we postulate a general form of a conﬁdence function below that depends
on a sequence of signals and their number, or time since the beginning of information
generation process. Let time be indexed as a discrete sequence of periods t=1，2，….
The conﬁdence function K is thus deﬁned by
K=Ks，t，
where s=s，s，…，s represents a sequence of signal realizations. Depending on a
speciﬁc model, the conﬁdence function should be assumed to take a particular form,
consistent with the evidence on decision making under uncertainty from the cognitive
psychology literature.
. Gaussian Random Variables and Exponential Utility
We develop our framework around the model of Vives (1995) [20]. While he considers
both shortterm and long-term investment horizons, we focus on long-term investment, as it
is more appropriate given our aim of analyzing dynamic eﬀects of conﬁdence and
information. We consider a simple multiple period economy― there is one risky asset with
random fundamental value v and one riskless bond with unitary return. The fundamental
value is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean v and variance σ  We shall
denote such a distribution N v，σ . It will be convenient to work with precisions instead
of variances : let τ=1/σ  denote the precision of a random variable ξ. Trading takes place
over T time periods ; at T+1 the risky asset is liquidated and its value v realized. To
focus on the interplay of information and investor conﬁdence, we assume that there exists
a continuum of privately informed identical risk-averse agents of mass one. An informed
trader receives at the beginning of period t a signal about the random ﬁnal payoﬀ in the
form s=v+ϵ, where ϵ follows N 0，σ ϵ and is uncorrelated across periods as well as
with other random variables. Informed traders remember all signals received up to the
present. In any period t an informed agent will thus be in possession of a vector of private
signals s=s，s，…，s. There are also noise traders present in the market at any
period ; their demands are formed for reasons exogenous to the model and are thus given
by an independently identically normally distributed process u

, which is assumed to
be also independent of all other random variables. Investors interact with competitive risk-
neutral market makers, who set the price to the expected value of the ﬁnal payoﬀ.
Informed investors are assumed to maximize expected utility of ﬁnal wealth
W=∑

p−p+v−p=∑

π. The utility function is thus given by
EU W=−Eexp −ρW, where ρ is the coeﬃcient of constant absolute risk aver-
sion. In what follows, we normalize v=0 and ρ=1, without loss of generality.
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The Conﬁdence Function
Typically, in CARA-Gaussian models, overconﬁdence is modeled either by a direct
assumption on a biased value of investorʼs information precision, or as a multiplier of the
precision. We thus follow the literature and assume that investor conﬁdence aﬀects her
beliefs in such a way that she multiplies the precision of her private information signal by
the conﬁdence function. Formally, while the original precision is given by τϵ, the precision
believed to be true by a conﬁdence-biased investor is Ks，tτϵ. We abstract for now
from an analysis of implications of particular forms of the conﬁdence function to focus ﬁrst
on general properties of the model with K as a function of time and of the vector of
signals, i.e. K=Ks，t. Given the evidence regarding strength and weight of information
and the assumed normal distributions of random variables, the conﬁdence function has to
exhibit certain properties, namely :
．At t=0，K=1 : no over- or underconﬁdence from the outset. It only arises in
response to speciﬁc information.
．0≤K<∞ for t≥2 : in general, K, as a multiplier of precision is allowed to take any
nonnegative value.
．For s =t∑

s，
∂K
∂∑

  s−s  /t
<0 : conﬁdence increases with more extreme,
salient signals (or a string of concentrated signals) and decreases with a series of
dispersed signals.
．∑

s→0⇒K≤1 : uncertainty increases― resulting in underconﬁdence― when
conﬂicting signals are received.
．lim K=1 : eventually, the value of the asset is known with enough accuracy so
that miscalibration disappears.
It is natural in this setting to deﬁne information of high strength and low weight as a
realization of a sequence of signals such that ∑

  s−s  /t≤l and t≤m ; analogically,
high-weight low-strength information is characterized by ∑

  s−s  /t≥l and t≥n,
where l , l, m, and n are appropriate cutoﬀ values.
Equilibrium
It follows from the properties of Gaussian random variables that a suﬃcient statistic for
s is
s

= ∑


τϵ

∑


τϵs. ⑴
The equilibrium price and individual (symmetric) demand functions are then calculated
using standard methods, and are given as follows.
p=λz+1−λΔap=
τ∑

Δaz
τ
⑵
=as

−p=K ∑


τϵs

−p, ⑶
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where :

λ=
τΔa
τ
is the price impact of trade (its reciprocate 1/λ is typically interpreted as a
measure of market liquidity) ;

z=Δav+u is the order ﬂow at time t；

τ=τ+τ∑

Δa

is the t-period conditional precision of the fundamental value ;

Δa=a−a represents the net trading intensity of informed traders, with a
=K∑

τϵ.
This unique linear equilibrium is a modiﬁcation of the one proved in Vives (1995) [20]
with the necessary adjustments to incorporate the conﬁdence function. Also, we simplify
his model in that in our setting traders receive homogeneous signals. It can be seen now
that the constant overconﬁdence assumption in various models
3)
may be exceedingly
restrictive ; resulting demand functions― and, in particular, trading intensities of informed
traders― are in fact contingent on speciﬁc sequence of signal realizations and ensuing
implications for asset price movements may cease to hold if we notice that conﬁdence
depends on the underlying information structure of the economy. In fact, Odean (1998, p.
1901) [17] himself asserts the dependence of investor conﬁdence on the salience of
information, although he does not attempt to explicitly analyze it.
In the next subsection, we consider a simple candidate conﬁdence function and proceed
to analyze equilibrium price behavior and other variables of interest that result when
tradersʼ conﬁdence is aﬀected dynamically by the strength and weight of information.
.. A Special Case : Four Trading Periods and a Simple Conﬁdence Function
To gain intuition as to how conﬁdence function aﬀects trading strategies and prices, we
introduce the following simple example. In the above CARA-Gaussian setup, consider a
conﬁdence function with only three possible values : K∈0.5，1，2. Neutral conﬁdence is
represented by K=1, overconﬁdence by K=2, and K=0.5 stands for underconﬁdence. Let
there be four trading periods, so that T=4, and the risky assetʼs ﬁnal payoﬀ is publicly
announced at T+1=5. In an environment where investors diﬀerentiate between good
(positive) and bad (negative) signals, let us study a very simple case such that the
information strength threshold is equal to two, i. e. when the diﬀerence between the
number of positive and negative signals is equal or exceeds two, information is viewed as
having ʻhigh strengthʼ. In the same manner, we set the information weight threshold at
four, so that when four signals are received, information is regarded as having ʻhigh
weightʼ.
At the beginning, in the ﬁrst period, traders act as if they were perfectly rational no
matter what the signal is― one signal is not strong enough information to give rise to
biased conﬁdence. In the second period, if the second signal is of the same sign as the ﬁrst
one, the conﬁdence function K jumps from K=1 to K=2, overconﬁdence appears and the
price overreacts to available information. This delayed overreaction happens with probabil-
ity 1/2. At t=3, overconﬁdence still pervades tradersʼ strategies if another, third signal of
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the same sign is observed ; thus K=2 and the price continues to overreact with
probability 1/4 and with probability 3/4 the conﬁdence function reverts to (or stays at) its
default neutral value K=1. Up until t=3, information was of low weight, and over-
conﬁdence ensued whenever information reached high strength. In the ﬁnal trading period
t=4 however, there are enough signals for investors to consider the available information
to exhibit high weight― there will be no overconﬁdence any more and the maximum
possible value for K will be K=1. Thus if in the fourth period the diﬀerence between
number of signals of the same sign is less than two, information is regarded as having
high weight and low strength. In such a case, the conﬁdence function jumps from K=1 to
K=0.5 and underconﬁdence arises. As a result, the price underreacts to a series of (four)
signals with probability 3/8. It is worthwhile to notice also that in case of previous
continued overreaction (due to overconﬁdence), the price is not adjusted to its rational
level in the fourth period, but merely the response to fourth signal of the same sign is
equivalent to a rational expectations response. In the ﬁnal period, the price is set to its
fundamental value.
With all the possible signal sequence realizations, there are two sequences that result in
both over- and underconﬁdence appearing at some time throughout the trading horizon :
either two positive signals are followed by two negative ones, or two negative signals are
followed by two positive ones. If one of these scenarios is the case, the equilibrium price
exhibits delayed overreaction, after which it stays at the overreaction level for one more
period ; subsequently, the price underreacts to the fourth, ﬁnal signal, and thus fails to
adjust to the rational expectations level.
Let us turn to the analysis of the expected path of conﬁdence function and its inﬂuence
on equilibrium trading intensities, information transmission, volatility and market depth. We
shall compare our results with the corresponding rational outcomes.
As mentioned above, overconﬁdence and underconﬁdence pervade the informed tradersʼ
demand functions with certain probabilities in diﬀerent trading periods ; we can thus
calculate the expected value of the conﬁdence function at all four trading dates. Thus, at
t=1, EK=K=1, EK=
24
16
, EK=
20
16
, and EK=
13
16
. Overconﬁdence expected at
dates t=2 and t=3 is obviously lower than it would be in case of constant overconﬁdence
― our results will thus diﬀer from constant overconﬁdence models. The sudden jump to
expected overconﬁdence at t=2 is followed by a slight correction in the expectation of
conﬁdence function at t=3 ; furthermore, at t=4, traders are even more “confused” as the
probability of receiving conﬂicting information increases, resulting in a decrease in investor
certainty, or underconﬁdence. Let us see how this pattern of expected conﬁdence aﬀects
equilibrium determination of trading magnitudes of interest. The ﬁgures below present the
temporal evolution of trading magnitudes for the cases of miscalibrated investors (dotted
lines) and rational investors (solid lines). The parameter values are τϵ=0.8，
∀k；τ=1.2；τ=1.
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Figure 2 : Net Trading Intensity
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Trading Intensity
Informed traders subject to biased conﬁdence trade with intensity a=K∑

τϵ. The
net trading intensity, Δa=a−a is also of interest. Overconﬁdent traders trade more
aggressively than rational investors in the second and third rounds of trade, but their
position turns out to be lower than the corresponding rational one in the ﬁnal, fourth
period. Moreover, it can be seen in Figure 1 and in Figure 2 that irrational investors
reverse partly their initial trades
4)
. These trading patterns diﬀer substantially both from the
the case of rational trading, as well as from from trading based on constant over-
conﬁdence.
Market Depth
Figure 3 shows the pattern of market liquidity proxy―market depth, which is a
reciprocal of the price impact of trade. Absolute market depth at time t is given by
λ
=
τ
τ  Δa 
. Two forces aﬀect the expected temporal evolution of liquidity : the net
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Figure 3 : Market Depth
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trading intensity Δa and the price volatility τ. Though initially they comove, later on the
increase in price precision is not as great as the diﬀerential trading intensity of informed
traders, and this second eﬀect dominates, resulting in a decrease in market depth. This
nonmonotonic pattern is a result of greater uncertainty on the part of irrational traders in
later trading rounds, and is in contrast to the increasing market depth in the case of
rational expectations.
Conditional Price Volatility and Price Precision
The precision of prices (depicted in Figure 5), given by τ=τ+τ∑

Δa

aﬀects in
turn conditional price volatility (Figure 4) Var p  p, which can be calculated to be
equal to Var p  p=
1
τ−1
−
1
τ
. Overconﬁdent investors make the price more informa-
tive than in case of rational traders, particularly when overconﬁdence ﬁrst appears, i.e. at
t=2. Subsequent increases in price precisions are much lower, and, in general, also lower
than the linear increase in price precision for the case of rational expectations. We have
thus shown that, even with multiple signals received throughout the the trading horizon,
the expected impact on price informativeness may diﬀer if investor conﬁdence is aﬀected
by information. Similarly for the case of conditional price volatility, which drops much more
sharply in response to “conﬁdence trading” than to rational trading.
While we emphasize that the results above were obtained for only a range of parameter
values, we believe they can hold in the general setting. We summarize the above results in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1．If investor conﬁdence is aﬀected by the strength and weight of information,
expected trading magnitudes for a range of parameter values display the following patterns :

Informed investors overreact to information initially and trade more aggressively than
rational investors, but they reverse partly their position later during the trading horizon.

Market depth is a nonmonotonic, inverted U-shaped curve. In particular, greater uncer-
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Figure 4 : Conditional Price Volatility
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tainty (“confusion”) on the part of irrational traders gives rise to a decrease in the
depth of the market with the increase of the amount of information available in the
economy.

Prices are more informative than in case of rational trading ; initial information has
greater impact on the price precision and conditional price volatility than late-arriving
information.
 Discussion
The analyses presented in this paper are consistent with evidence from the cognitive
psychology literature. In particular, our assumptions are consistent with both the results of
Griﬃn and Tversky (1992) [12] on the possibility of underconﬁdence when information is
regarded as having high weight, and with those documented by Peterson and Pitz (1988)
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[18] on the increase in uncertainty when more information is available. Moreover, we have
been able to generate an interesting empirical prediction regarding the overreaction bias in
asset prices― overreaction is delayed. This happens in our model because although
investors overestimate their information, they are not necessarily overconﬁdent right from
the starting point ; rather, when a string of signals arrives, people act rationally at ﬁrst and
only after the information generated by the signals has become salient enough, they
overreact and become overconﬁdent. Similarly with underreaction and underconﬁdence― it
only matters contingent on the information that appears within the economy. This
interplay of (ir) rationality and information has so far received little attention in the
literature ; while we do not postulate that it is the only right way to go about explaining
the behavior in ﬁnancial markets, it seems to be at least worth investigation as a part of a
coherent comprehensive asset pricing theory.
Notice that, in contrast with the existing literature, irrational traders in our models are
not always irrational― at the beginning of the trading horizon, there is little information
and thus no particular reason for biased behavior, in accordance with the experimental
evidence. On the other hand, with enough information already revealed in the economy, it
is conceivable to admit that most information is public and there is no more room for
irrationality to inﬂuence prices. The traders in our setting thus suﬀer from “temporal
irrationality”.
The assumptions we impose on the behavior of traders are admittedly rather strong.
However, we defend this approach by ﬁrst noting that the assumptions are in fact
consistent with evidence on miscalibration and information presented in the ﬁrst part of
the paper. In particular, biased conﬁdence evolves in our model as a function of informa-
tion, which lies at the backbone of the economy. This contrasts with the setup in Gervais
and Odean (2001) [11], who instead allow investors in their model to update their
conﬁdence levels according to feedback from their investment performance. In a way, their
biased conﬁdence stems from another bias concerning the evaluation of oneʼs own perform-
ance. It is debatable which approach is more suitable and perhaps a combination of both
methods could lead us onto further insights about the inﬂuence of biased conﬁdence in
asset markets.
Our choice of modeling the conﬁdence function may not be stable to changes in setups.
The next step in analyzing the interplay of information and conﬁdence would be arguably
endogenizing the conﬁdence function. If we can understand how information aﬀects
uncertainty and investor conﬁdence by explaining it as an equilibrium phenomenon, our
knowledge of the processes behind numerous issues of importance in ﬁnancial economics
and generally social sciences should be expected to only expand.
 Concluding Remarks
We have attempted in this paper to introduce biases in conﬁdence resulting from
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particular attributes of information into a general ﬁnancial market setting. Consistent with
experimental evidence, we posit that conﬁdence is inﬂuenced by the strength and weight
of information. Conﬁdence function is introduced as a way of formalizing the relationship
between information and conﬁdence. We have shown that if investorsʼ conﬁdence is
aﬀected by information strength and information weight, then prices exhibit delayed
overreaction to information events ; this overreaction may continue for a prolonged period
of time. Furthermore, as more and more information is introduced, uncertainty increases
among irrational investors and prices tend to underreact to ambiguous news. In another
model based on a generalized setting, we have found that depending on the intensity of
irrational trading, prices exhibit positive serial correlation when there are few miscalibrated
traders in the economy or their bias is moderate ; prices overreact to news if the opposite
conditions are met.
We view our simple approach as a starting point for a more comprehensive analysis of
the interplay between bounded rationality, uncertainty, and information. It is questionable
that irrational behavior is built into human decision making processes― rather, it is an
outcome of various inﬂuences, among which information and its many aspects seem
particularly important. Hence, we make a step towards elaborating on Arrowʼs (1986) [1]
assertion that “rationality is not a property of the individual alone” ; he further argues that
only under very ideal conditions the assumption of rationality is plausible ; in complex
environments, characterized by composite information structures, the rationality assump-
tions “become strained and possibly even self-contradictory
5)
”. Further research should
concentrate on pinpointing the conditions under which rationality ceases to be a credible
hypothesis and identifying ensuing consequences for economic variables of interest.
Notes
1) Griﬃn and Tversky (1992) [12], page 422.
2) The two examples correspond to information strengths of 50 and 8.8 respectively, which
translates to the ﬁrst case with 3 tosses being roughly 5.7 times stronger information than the
second case― see Nelson et. al. (2001) [16], p. 175, Table 1.
3) See Benos (1998) [2], Odean (1998) [17], or Caballé and Sákovics (2003) [8], among others.
4) Trade reversals are also shown to be caused by insider trading in Brunnermeier (2005) [6].
5) Arrow (1986) [1], page 385.
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